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Abstract
We broaden the conceptual framework of estimating markups at the sectoral level developed 
by Roeger (1995), and extended by Crépon et al. (2005) with labour market imperfections, 
to account for fi rm-level heterogeneity derived from differences in productivity. We estimate 
this model with a comprehensive panel of Spanish non-fi nancial corporations for the period 
2001-2007 to fi nd that perfect competition is widely rejected in the data. More interestingly, 
within each sector, fi rms with higher productivity present higher markups. Further, we use 
this empirical setting to estimate changes in fi rm-level markups over the course of the crisis 
(2008/2012). Our results indicate that for around 50% of sectors average markups increased, 
following a decrease in the number of fi rms, while for around 35% of industries the relevance 
of within-sector markup heterogeneity decreased at the same time that the variance of 
within-sector TFP increased. This last result suggests that the simple changes in the number 
and composition of competing fi rms cannot explain within-sector markups and we require 
additional factors to account for recent developments. For instance, we provide evidence that 
both an increase in consumer product substitutability and in fi xed entry costs during the crisis 
might be a good explanation.
Keywords: markups, production function, market power, heterogeneity.
JEL classifi cation: C23, C26, D24, E31, L11, L16.
Resumen
Incorporamos heterogeneidad empresarial en productividad dentro del marco de estimación 
tradicional de márgenes desarrollado por Roeger (1995) y ampliado por Crépon et al. (2005) para 
dar cabida a fricciones en la negociación salarial. Calculamos márgenes a escala de empresa 
con un panel completo de sociedades no fi nancieras españolas para el período 2001-2007, 
mostrando que existe competencia imperfecta generalizada en España. Asimismo, dentro 
de cada sector, las empresas con mayor productividad presentan márgenes más elevados. 
Finalmente, se utiliza el mismo marco para analizar cómo han variado los márgenes en el 
período de crisis entre 2008 y 2012. Nuestros resultados indican que alrededor del 50 % de 
los sectores incrementaron márgenes medios a raíz de una reciente disminución en el número 
de empresas, mientras que alrededor del 35 % de las industrias mostraron incrementos en los 
diferenciales de márgenes entre empresas simultáneos al incremento de la varianza de la PTF 
sectorial. Este último resultado sugiere que, si bien son un factor importante, los cambios en 
el número y la composición de las empresas competidoras no pueden explicar la totalidad de 
la evolución de los márgenes y se requiere de factores adicionales para explicar los últimos 
acontecimientos. Una hipótesis coherente con el anterior resultado vendría por el lado de la 
demanda y estaría relacionada con la disminución de la posibilidad de sustitución de diferentes 
variedades de consumo intrasectoriales.
Palabras clave: márgenes, función de producción, poder de mercado, heterogeneidad.
Códigos JEL: C23, C26, D24, E31, L11, L16.
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1 Introduction 
Many scholars have recently emphasized the substantial implications derived from a 
significant degree of firm-level heterogeneity within-sector. This idea has been underpinned by 
important breakthroughs on trade theory (e.g. Bernard et al (2003), Melitz (2003), Melitz and 
Ottaviano (2008)) and on firm dynamics and factor reallocation (see, e.g., Bartelsman et al. 
(2013) and the references therein). These approaches highlight that there is a significant 
degree of heterogeneity in productivity, size, and other firms’ characteristics, even within 
narrowly defined industries that have major consequences for the performance of many 
variables, such as aggregate productivity or export performance. This business heterogeneity 
has also received increasing attention, especially in the area that analyzes the strategic 
behaviour of firms, as it will definitely affect firm’s pricing policies. In particular, in most models 
of oligopolistic competition regardless of whether the competition is done via quantities or 
prices or the degree of differentiation of the products, firms with lower marginal costs must 
charge higher markups. This is the case because more efficient firms expect a weaker 
competition from their competitors knowing that their marginal costs are likely to be higher. 
Hence, the strength of competition and as a consequence the average markup will depend in 
both the amount and the characteristics of potential competing firms. 
This paper takes up changes in the composition of firms, both within and across sectors, with 
the aim of studying its potential role in Spanish firms’ pricing behavior, paying particular 
attention to the period 2008-2012, where aggregate price-cost margins increased a lot 
(Figure 1). In order to account for this firm level heterogeneity, we will enrich a traditional 
methodology for estimating sector-level markups of prices over marginal costs –that of 
Roeger (1995)– to obtain distributions of firm-level markups within sector that depend on 
certain firm-specific characteristics.  
 
 
Figure 1: Profit share of Spanish non-financial corporations. 
Consistent with the evidence shown in Figure 1 and in Montero and Urtasun (2014), we show 
that in around 50% of sectors average markups increased in Spain when comparing the 
boom phase (2001-2007) with the period of crisis (2008-2012).  
Source: National Statistics Institute. Computed as gross operating 
surplus/gross value added.
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When analyzing the evolution of Spanish price-cost markups over time, we will follow a 
different approach to that in Montero and Urtasun (2014). These authors argue that in a 
context characterized by extreme financial tensions, many firms were not able to raise 
external funds, so they had to raise price-cost markups to get internal cash, even in the face 
of weak demand, in order to be able to meet their ongoing financial commitments, as well as 
to build buffers of internal funds to finance investment projects. They provide empirical 
evidence that, indeed, the increase in markups since 2008 in Spain may have been driven, 
among other factors, by a change in pricing strategies by financially-constrained firms. In this 
paper we explore an additional channel that works through changes in the number and in the 
composition of active firms and that might provide a complementary explanation. In particular, 
financial restrictions during the crisis have also brought about an increase both in fixed costs 
of entry and in the rate of business destruction, leading to an important decrease in the 
number of active businesses and, thus, in the degree of product market competition (see 
Figure 2). This, in turn, contributed to the rise in average markups. 
Figure 2: Evolution of entry and exit rates (% of active firms), 1998-2013. 
At the same time, active firms have been more polarized in terms of productivities (the 
variance of TFP has increased notably in most sectors during the crisis, see Figure 3). These 
results are consistent with those in Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015) and in García-Santana et al. 
(2015). This increase in productivity dispersion –which is a proxy for resource misallocation– 
should reinforce the abovementioned increase in average markups (Bernard et al. (2003), 
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Peters (2011)). Complementary, the increase in the variance of 
TFP should have increased the variance of markups within sector, all else equal. However, in 
our empirical section we provide some evidence that for 1/3 of the industries considered the 
sensitivity of markups to productivity heterogeneity across firms decreased.  
The rest of the document is organized as follows. Section 2 spells out the theoretical 
background and section 3 will define the empirical approach. Section 4 describes the main 
characteristics of the database, in Section 5 and 6 discuss several estimation results for the 
period 2001-2007 and the great recession respectively. Finally, Section 7 interprets the 
results and section 8 concludes. 
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Figure 3: Evolution of sectoral TFP dispersion. 
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2 Theoretical background 
There are many empirical papers that study the (cyclical) evolution of price-cost 
markups over time, in particular for the US. There are different types of models that explain 
movements in markups over the cycle: models of variable demand elasticity, models of 
variable entry, models of sticky prices, models of investment in market share and financial 
frictions and models of implicit collusion.1 However, to the best of our knowledge, none of 
these contributions take into account the role played by firm-level heterogeneity, which, as 
stated in the introduction, may have substantial implications for the performance of many 
variables and has gain momentum in the macro literature.  
 
In particular recent macro papers (Bernard et al (2003), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Peters 
(2011)) model firm level markups as a random variable depending on the characteristics of the 
potential competitors (number and distribution of marginal costs) and certain parameters of 
the demand function. Those models usually depart from a model of oligopolistic competition 
of differentiated goods where producers of a particular good compete ala Bertrand within 
their own variety. In this case, markups will be determined on the one hand by the distance of 
the most efficient firm and their best competitors, and on the other by the degree of 
substitutability of the differentiated goods. As a result, within a sector more productive firms 
will charge higher markups and, as it is clear in Peters (2011), the variance of markups will be 
clearly determined by the variance of the distribution of potential competitors’ marginal costs.  
Those two results are pretty general in many industrial organization models. We illustrate this 
point using Vogel (2008) who develops a model with endogenous horizontal product 
differentiation and heterogeneous firms. He sets out a game of two stages (first, location, and 
second pricing) and solves for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) allowing firms to 
reallocate in terms of varieties in the first stage. Vogel shows that in an SPNE in a sector s 
with ୱ varieties, a shipping cost ɒୱ –to ship a good to a consumer located at a point z– and a 
cost of shopping ୱ –which reflects either the cost the consumer incurs traveling to and from 
the firm, or the utility a consumer loses purchasing a good that differs from his ideal variety– a 
firm i sets its price ୧ୱ given its marginal cost ୧ୱ and the average marginal costୱ as in 
equation [1]:2  
 
୧ୱ െ ୧ୱ ൌ ୲
౩ାத౩
୬౩ െ Ƚଵሺୱǡ ɒୱሻ൫୧ୱ െ ୱ൯     [1] 
ሺ୧ୱ െ ୧ୱሻ ൌ Ƚଵሺୱǡ ɒୱሻଶሺ୧ୱሻ     [2] 
As it happened in the abovementioned macro models, according to equation [2] the variance 
of the markup will be related to the variance of the marginal cost. However, notice that the 
relationship is not 1 to 1 and the degree of substitutability of goods might also affect the 
variance of markups. 
                                                          
1 See the seminal contribution by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) for a comprehensive survey. Montero and Urtasun 
(2014) share the same spirit of those papers in their study the Spanish case. 
2 Although Vogel’s model is set in terms of marginal costs, the overall spirit is in terms of efficiency and, indeed, he uses 
interchangeably marginal costs and productivity. Therefore, we will assume that there is a relation between marginal 
costs and TFP of the type  ୧ୱ ൌ ଴ െ ଵ୧ୱ which will allow us to identify markups in the empirical exercise. Hence, the 
terms marginal costs and productivity (or TFP) will be used interchangeably throughout the text as well.  
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In equilibrium, within a sector, firms with lower marginal costs are more isolated –i.e. face 
lower competition from neighbor varieties–, because neighboring firms adjust their locations 
to avoid harsh competition from low-cost firms, which in turn can charge higher markups. 
Also, a change in the marginal cost of any competing firm (keeping constant the number of 
firms and all the other marginal costs/productivities) is translated to all markups through a 
change in the average marginal cost of the market. This is the case because, according to the 
previous result, productivity and isolation go together. Therefore, if one firm increases its own 
productivity it becomes more isolated and all the other firms must be closer to each other to 
avoid competition with that firm.  
 
Finally, as in the typical spatial competition model (Salop (1979), Lancaster (1979) and 
Economides (1989)), more firms lead to lower markups. Interestingly, in a sector with high 
shopping costs, the importance of firms’ heterogeneity in marginal costs is lower, i.e. 
Ƚଵሺୱǡ ɒୱሻ is smaller, and the magnitude of average markups ୲
౩ାத౩
୬౩  is higher.
3 To see this one 
would need to compute the equilibrium number of firms. Although this is not done in Vogel 
(2008), we can make an intuitive approximation.4 Following Syverson (2004) one might think 
of entry as the first stage decision of a sequential game before firms know their level of 
marginal cost ୧ୱ (afterwards they decide its final location and markup). Hence, entry will 
equate expected profits with fixed costs of entry (ୱሻand therefore ୱכ ൌ ට୐౩୲౩ୣ౩  where ୱ is the 
size of the demand.5  
 
Summing up, changes in shopping costs (ୱ) are negatively related to the importance of 
marginal costs among firms in determining markups (Ƚଵሺୱሻሻand positively related to changes 
in average markups and the number of active firms. On the other hand, changes in fixed 
costs of entry are positively related to average markups due to an implied decrease in the 
number of active firms. 
 
This setting provides an overall framework for studying the determination of markups by 
sector which is well related to previous literature.6 Notice that the average markup will 
positively depend on the size of demand, the (im)possibility to substitute for consumers one 
particular product by another, and fixed entry costs. As regards the degree of substitutability, 
this characteristic of demand provides certain market power to all firms in the sector and 
generates a downward sloping demand curve for each firm. A sector with many 
homogeneous products will face a low markup compared to a sector with highly differentiated 
goods.7 Poor substitutability might arise from different reasons, such as horizontal 
differentiation, as in the Hotelling (1929) or d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) 
model, vertical differentiation with products differentiated by quality (Gabszewicz and Thisse 
(1979), Shaked and Sutton (1982)), and high switching costs (Syverson (2004)) that prevent 
consumers from changing products over time –thus providing a certain degree of monopoly 
to the incumbent firms–. Fixed entry costs are connected with the existence of barriers to 
entry, which can adopt different formulations. From a supply-side point of view, they include 
factors such as control over essential inputs, the existence of economies of scale and 
network effects, and the presence of fixed sunk costs. In sum, high costs of entry tend to 
                                                          
3 See proposition 1 in Vogel (2008). 
4 From now on, we will abstract from transport costs and set ߬௦ ൌ Ͳ. 
5 Hence, average markups for sector s are  ୱȀୱ ൌ ටୱୱ Τ . 
6 It has to be recognized that changes in markups are not only driven by changes in marginal costs and/or in the degree 
of competition. Heterogeneity in firm’s demand (due to innovation, network effects, etc) can be relevant as well.  
7 Substitutability is also related with the size of the market, as stressed by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Melitz 
(2003), who point to the negative impact on prices and markups when markets are opened to foreign competition. 
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generate some sort of economies of scale leading to different markups across sectors, 
because in equilibrium, firms entering production require to recover these costs in the future 
(Shaked and Sutton (1983)). There are additional barriers to entry derived from public 
intervention, regulations, etc (Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)).8  
Firm-level sources of cost efficiency are many and varied, but can be summarized in three 
main factors: productivity, access to credit markets and labour market flexibility. In this paper 
we will focus on productivity, as measured by TFP, as it is the variable that captures all those 
factors that affect the efficiency with which a firm combines factors of production in order to 
get a final output, which result in costs savings (or equivalently, in improvements of product 
quality). In order to proxy for productivity at a firm level, we will estimate TFP following the 
control function method developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003).  
Thus, once we have estimated firm-specific TFP, markups of equation [1] will be determined 
in the following way: 
୧ǡ୲ୱ െ ୧ǡ୲ୱ ൌ Ⱦ଴୲ ൅ Ⱦଵ୲൫	୧ǡ୲ୱ െ 	୲ୱതതതതതതത൯     [3] 
where Ͳ ൏ Ⱦ଴ ൏ ͳǢ Ⱦଵ ൐ Ͳ. Notice that the left hand side of equation [3] is unobservable, so 
we require a methodology to estimate them that will be spelled out in the following section. 
Regarding labour market flexibility, for the time span of the data we use (2001-2012), we can 
fairly assume that work-related flexibility is quite similar across firms in a given sector, as in the 
Spanish case it is heavily reliant on institutions governing the labour market at the sector level 
(see Bentolila et al. (2012)). As we will show below, in section 3, this feature will translate into 
a modification of the empirical model, in order to take into account some of the institutional 
characteristics of the Spanish labour market. However, this modification will not enter directly 
into equation [3]. 
More difficult to tackle is the issue of access to the financial sector. In this case, we adopt a 
pragmatic approach and enlarge the baseline model in an ad hoc fashion to include some of 
the proxies used by the financial pressure literature, in particular, the leverage ratio (liabilities 
over assets) –see equation [4] below.9 Since results are similar to the ones presented in the 
paper, and since the main focus is on heterogeneity derived from productivity, they will not be 
presented, but are available upon request.  
୧ǡ୲ୱ െ ୧ǡ୲ୱ ൌ Ⱦ଴୲ ൅ Ⱦଵ୲൫	୧ǡ୲ୱ െ 	୲ୱതതതതതതത൯ ൅ Ⱦଶ୲൫୧ǡ୲ୱ െ ୲ୱതതതതതതതത൯     [4] 
 
                                                          
8 A final type of barriers to entry is related to the exclusionary practices developed by incumbent firms, understood as 
strategic behavior to deter entry, e.g. investing in extra capacity, bundling, price discrimination, etc. 
9 As shown by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), credit might be affected on the demand side by the balance-sheet strength 
of the firms, which can be proxied by the capital ratio position (or the inverse of the ratio of liabilities over assets). 
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3 Empirical methodology  
Firm-specific markups during the expansion period 2001-2007  
We introduce the previous setup in an empirical model to obtain firm-level markups 
relying on standard cost minimization conditions for variable inputs free of adjustment costs in 
a Neoclassical setting. This is, essentially, the approach developed by Robert Hall in 
successive papers (1986, 88, 90), and which is the basis for many papers trying to estimate 
price-cost markups relying on microdata from accounting information. Formally, we have a 
firm with the typical production function Q = A·F(K,L,M), where Q is total production, A is 
technical progress and K, L and M are capital, labour and intermediate goods, respectively. 
Assuming that the production function is differentiable, then it holds that:  
ο ൌ ɂ୩ο ൅ ɂ୪ο ൅ ɂ୫ο൅ ο  [5]
where  ɂ୏ ൌ ப୕ப୏
୏
୕ Ǣɂ୐ ൌ
ப୕
ப୐
୐
୕ Ǣɂ୑ ൌ
ப୕
ப୑
୑
୕ represent the output elasticity with respect to the 
different inputs, and lower case variables denote the logs of those variables. 
Moreover, if the production function has constant returns to scale, it must hold that:  
ͳ ൌ ɂ୩ ൅ ɂ୪ ൅ ɂ୫    [6]
Finally, if we assume that the firm has some market power, it will face a downward sloping 
demand curve Qd(P) and will maximize its profit given that demand. In that case, the 
maximization problem will lead to the following conditions:10 
ɂ୏ ൌ ୏ɊሺሻǢ ɂ୐ ൌ ୐ɊሺሻǢ ɂ୑ ൌ ୑Ɋሺሻ   [7] 
where ୏ ൌ ୰୏୔୕ Ǣ୐ ൌ
୵୐
୔୕ Ǣ୑ ൌ
୮ౣ୑
୔୕  represent the expenditure share of each factor in total 
production and μ(f) is defined as the firm’s markup of price over marginal cost, which might 
vary across firms due to different factors (denoted by f) related to the structure of demand, 
the type of competition, the technology available and the regulation setting. As it will be made 
clearer later, here is where the theoretical framework discussed above will enter. 
With these set of assumptions, and noting that ߤሺ݂ሻ ൌ ଵଵି஻ሺ௙ሻ –where B(f) represents the 
Lerner index ((P-MC)/P≈ pi – ki)–, equations [5]-[7] imply the following relationship:  
 ൌ ο െ ሺͳ െ ୐ െ ୑ሻο െ ୐ο െ ୑ο ൌ ሺሻሺο െ οሻ ൅ ሺͳ െ ሺሻሻο    [8] 
To the extent that technical progress is not correlated with the cycle, e.g. ο୲ ൌ Ʌ ൅ ୲, where 
ut is an iid technological disturbance, the existence of market power amplifies the movements 
of output generated by changes in other inputs.11 However, in reality there are many reasons 
why one could think that technical progress might be correlated with the cycle and that is why 
                                                          
10 Under the maintained assumption of no adjustment costs. 
11 Notice that equation [8] could be rewritten as: ሺο െ οሻ ൌ Ɋ୐ሺο െ οሻ ൅ Ɋ୑ሺοെ οሻ ൅ ଵஜ ο   
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scholars approached the estimation of [6] from an instrumental variables perspective.12 In this 
paper, acknowledging the difficulty of searching for good instruments in this setting, we follow 
another strategy initiated by Roeger (1995). He realized that under constant returns to scale a 
similar expression to [8] could be obtained in terms of prices, for the so-called “dual” Solow 
residual:  
ୢ ൌ ο െ ୐ο െ ୑ο୫ െ ሺͳ െ ୐ െ ୑ሻο ൌ ሺሻሺο െ οሻ ൅ ሺሻԢο െ ሺͳ െ ሺሻሻο        
[9] 
Therefore, adding [8] and [9]13 we get an expression where the technological progress is 
cancelled out, so that instrumental variables would not be needed anymore:  
 ൅ ୢ ൌ ሺሻሾሺο ൅ οሻ െ ሺο ൅ οሻሿ ൅ ሺሻԢο                                       [10] 
At the end of the day, as expression [10] shows, we just need to compute the Solow residual 
in nominal terms and relate it to the difference of the value of production and the nominal cost 
of capital services in order to attain an estimate of the price-cost markup.  
As it has been discussed in the previous section, we assume that imperfections in the labour 
market have a similar effect on all firms within a sector. In order to incorporate this idea, we 
enlarge the previous model by adding imperfect competition in the labour market as in 
Crépon et al. (2005) or Dobbelare (2004).14 Under imperfect labour markets, wages and the 
number of workers are simultaneously chosen according to a standard efficient bargaining 
problem. Denoting 0<I<1 as the workers’ bargaining power (I=0 corresponds to competitive 
labour markets) in a typical Nash bargaining framework that involves sharing the surplus 
between firms that maximize profits and workers whose utility depends on employment and 
wages, it could be shown that expression [10] can be rewritten as:  
 ൅ ୢ ൌ ሺሻሾሺο ൅ οሻ െ ሺο ൅ οሻሿ ൅ ሺሻԢο ൅ Ԅͳ െ Ԅሺ୐ െ ͳሻሾሺο ൅ οሻ െ ሺο ൅ οሻሿ 
                    [11] 
All in all, the empirical counterpart of equation [11] that will be estimated in the paper with 
firm-level data by each 2-digit sector s is: 
ο୧୲ୱ ൌ ൣȾ଴ୗ ൅ Ⱦଵୗ൫୧୲ିଵୱ െ തതതത୲ିଵୱ ൯൧ο୧୲ୱ ൅ ɏୱο୧୲ିଵୱ ൅ Ɂୱο୧୲ୱ ൅ ɀୱ ή ୲ୱ ൅ ɂ୧୲ୱ        [12] 
where ο is the nominal Solow residual; ο ൌ ο െ ο; ο ൌ ο െ ο; ୲ୱ is a set of time 
dummies. We have substituted B(f) for equation [3], i.e. ܤሺ݂ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺݐ݂݌ െ ݐ݂݌തതതതതሻ, making 
markups depend on a sector-specific constant (Ⱦ଴ୗ) –which will capture average sectoral 
markups– and on the difference between firm-specific TFP and average TFP of a given sector 
s, which will account for firm-level heterogeneity along the lines discussed in the previous 
section. 
                                                          
12 In the case of Hall (1988), he chose national GDP growth as an instrument for the industry labour growth 
13 The term ሺሻԢο in equation [9] appears because of the assumption that markups are a function of factors f. See, for 
a derivation, Thum-Thysen and Canton (2015). 
14 Many papers have used this framework before. See, inter alia, Abraham et al. (2009), Amador and Soares (2013) or, 
for the case of Spain, Estrada (2009) and Moreno and Rodriguez (2011). To the best of our knowledge, none of them 
introduces firm heterogeneity the way we do, with the purpose of obtaining estimates of firm-level markups. 
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As we want to analyze whether the estimated coefficients of equation [12] have changed over 
the crisis, we have to first deal with a relevant confounding factor that took place in 2008, 
namely, a major change in general accounting rules that could potentially have affected the 
way firms reported the variables needed to construct οǡ οǡ ο. This factor may have been 
compounded by the fact that it happened amidst a deep economic and financial crisis, which 
generates incentives for firms to manage their accounts in order to improve their financial 
position. One way to tackle this problem is by assuming that there is a measurement error in 
the way firms report the variables underlying οǡ οǡ ο, leading to some biases in the 
estimation of coefficients in equation [12]. To see how this problem may affect our results, 
let’s assume that ο is observed with measurement error ୧୲ୱ ̱ሺͲǡ ɐ୳ୱ ሻ.15 Let’s assume that 
the measurement error is classical within each sector, therefore, it is uncorrelated with all 
dependent and independent variables and the error term of each particular sector. 
Consequently, we would observe: 
οన୲ୱ෢ ൌ ο୧୲ୱ ൅ ୧୲ୱ  ൏ ʹͲͲͺሾ૚૜ሿ 
If we restrict the sample to the period 2001-2007 and we plug equation [13] into [12] we 
have: 
ο୧୲ୱ ൌ Ⱦ଴ǡழଶ଴଴଼ୗ οన୲ୱ෢ ൅ Ⱦଵǡழଶ଴଴଼ୗ ൫୧୲ୱ െ തതതത୲ୱ൯οన୲ୱ෢ ൅ڮ൅ ɂ୧୲ୱ ൅ Ⱦ଴ǡழଶ଴଴଼ୗ ୧୲ୱ ൅ 
൅Ⱦଵǡழଶ଴଴଼ୗ ൫୧୲ୱ െ തതതത୲ୱ൯୧୲ୱ  ൏ ʹͲͲͺ 
As a consequence, both the estimated average levels of markups and their sensitivity to the 
TFP distributions will be biased downwards, which has to be taken into account when 
interpreting the results, unless the variance of the measurement error is 0. Algebraically: 
ÇȾ଴ǡழଶ଴଴଼ୗ෣ ൌ Ⱦ଴ǡழଶ଴଴଼ୗ
ሺο୲ୱሻ
ሺο୲ୱሻ ൅ ɐ୳ୱ  
ÇȾଵǡழଶ଴଴଼ୗ෣ ൌ Ⱦଵǡழଶ଴଴଼ୗ
ሺο୲ୱǡ ୲ୱሻ
ሺο୲ୱǡ ୲ୱሻ ൅ ɐ୳ୱ  
Turning to the crisis period, let’s assume that the change in accounting rules affected the way 
ο is reported and hence what is observed by the econometrician is: 
οన୲ୱ෢ ൌ ൜ο୧୲
ୱ ൅ ୧୲ୱ  ൏ ʹͲͲͺ
ο୧୲ୱ ൅ ୧୲ୱ  ൒ ʹͲͲͺ 
where ୧୲ୱ ̱ሺͲǡ ɐ୴ୱሻ comes from a different distribution than the one affecting variables until 
2008. If both us and vs are classical measurement errors, the difference in their variances will 
determine the change in estimated coefficients between both periods. In particular, if the 
variance of the measurement error is higher after the accounting rule change (ɐ୴ୱ ൐ ɐ୳ୱ ) –which 
seems plausible–, then estimated coefficients (including markups) would go down without the 
need of any real change in pricing strategies. In other words: 
ÇȾ଴ǡழଶ଴଴଼ୗ෣ ൌ Ⱦ଴ǡழଶ଴଴଼ୗ ୴ୟ୰ሺο୶౪
౩ሻ
୴ୟ୰ሺο୶౪౩ሻା஢౫౩
>Ⱦ଴ǡஹଶ଴଴଼ୗ ୴ୟ୰ሺο୶౪
౩ሻ
୴ୟ୰ሺο୶౪౩ሻା஢౬౩
ൌ ÇȾ଴ǡஹଶ଴଴଼ୗ෣  
ÇȾଵǡழଶ଴଴଼ୗ෣ ൌ Ⱦଵǡழଶ଴଴଼ୗ ୴ୟ୰ሺο୶౪
౩୲୤୮౪౩ሻ
୴ୟ୰ሺο୶౪౩୲୤୮౪౩ሻା஢౫౩
>Ⱦଵǡஹଶ଴଴଼ୗ ୴ୟ୰ሺο୶౪
౩୲୤୮౪౩ሻ
୴ୟ୰ሺο୶౪౩୲୤୮౪౩ሻା஢౬౩
ൌ ÇȾଵǡஹଶ଴଴଼ୗ෣  
                                                          
15 The argument will hold as well for errors in the measurement of ο affecting the parameter capturing union’s 
bargaining power. Errors in ο do not affect the estimation.  
Changes in firm-specific markups during the crisis 2008-2012 
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In order to identify a genuine change in structural parameters over the crisis, we will compare 
estimated coefficients of two sub-periods within the 5 years available with the new accounting 
rules. To be more specific, we make two assumptions that will help us identify a possible 
change in firms’ pricing behavior across industries. First, we assume that changes in 
accounting rules affected the same way all firms within a sector. Second, we assume that the 
adaptation to the new accounting rules is rather immediate, taking a couple of years (2008 
and 2009), whereas changes in pricing strategies require some time to materialize and begin 
in 2010, once the first stage of the crisis is over. All in all, this means that the estimated 
regression for the evolution of price-cost markups over the crisis is as follows: 
ο୧୲ୱ ൌ ቂȾ଴ǡ଴ୗ ൅ Ⱦ଴ǡଵୗ ή ୲ଶ଴଴଼Ȁଵଶ ൅ Ⱦ଴ǡଶୗ ή ୲ଶ଴ଵ଴Ȁଵଶ ൅ Ⱦଵǡ଴ୗ ή ሺ୧୲ିଵୱ ሻ ൅ Ⱦଵǡଵୗ ή ሺ୧୲ିଵୱ ሻ ή ୲ଶ଴଴଼Ȁଵଶ ൅ Ⱦଵǡଶୗ ή
ሺ୧୲ିଵୱ ሻ ή ୲ଶ଴ଵ଴Ȁଵଶ൧ο୧୲ୱ ൅ ɏୱο୧୲ିଵୱ ൅ ቂɁ଴ǡ଴ୱ ൅ Ɂ଴ǡଵୱ ή ୲ଶ଴଴଼Ȁଵଶ ൅ Ɂ଴ǡଶୱ ή ୲ଶ଴ଵ଴Ȁଵଶቃο୧୲ୱ ൅ ɀୱ ή ୲ୱ ൅ ɂ୧୲ୱ      
[14] 
where ୲ଶ଴଴଼Ȁଵଶ is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for the period 2008-2012 and ୲ଶ଴ଵ଴Ȁଵଶ 
is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for the period 2010-2012. Besides, fs is defined as 
୧୲ୱ െ തതതത୲ୱ. In this setting, we interpret the term Ⱦ଴ǡ଴ୗ ൅ Ⱦଵǡ଴ୗ ή ሺ୧୲ିଵୱ ሻ as a lower bound for the 
distribution of firm-specific markups and the term Ⱦ଴ǡ଴ୗ ൅ Ⱦ଴ǡଶୗ ή ୲ଶ଴ଵ଴Ȁଵଶ ൅ Ⱦଵǡ଴ୗ ή ሺ୧୲ିଵୱ ሻ ൅ Ⱦଵǡଶୗ ή
ሺ୧୲ିଵୱ ሻ ή ୲ଶ଴ଵ଴Ȁଵଶ would provide the direction of the change in the distribution of firm-specific 
markups during the crisis free of changes in accounting rules. 
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4 Database 
Our dataset combines information from several data sources, although the main 
source will be the Central Balance Sheet Data Office (CBSO) of the Banco de España. These 
data are collected from two sources: first, a CBSO’s own database elaborated from a yearly 
survey and balance-sheet information of firms collaborating on voluntary grounds16 –which 
shall be called CBA–; and second, data from financial statements deposited yearly in official 
Mercantile Registries by all active companies –which we will label CBB–.17 We assembled an 
unbalanced panel of non-financial corporations covering almost all (two-digit) industries for 
the period 1995-2012 (see table in the Appendix A for a list of sectors).18 
One of the advantages of combining both databases is that we achieve a selection of firms 
reasonably representative of the population, in terms of the shares of firms by both sector of 
activity and firm size. A second advantage is that we attain a sample with a very good 
coverage rate, of over 40% of nonfinancial corporations’ value added (see CBSDO (2014)). 
Although the quality of the data is reasonably good as it passes numerous filters, we were 
very careful with outliers and/or incoherencies. In our study only operating firms with positive 
operating costs (labour, material and capital expenditures) throughout the year have been 
included. We dropped all observations that did not report the required variables, as well as 
those with strange values, such as negative figures of employment, capital stock, sales or 
assets, or extreme ones.19 After cleaning the data, we were left with an unbalanced panel of 
firms covering the period 2001-2012,20 with information for a median (mean) of 5 (4.5) years 
of 1,063,713 firms (potentially 6,055,080 observations in total). The basic characteristics of 
this sample of firms are displayed in Table 1.  
  
                                                          
16 The reporting firms fill in a questionnaire with detailed accounting information, as well as some other additional 
information on employment, breakdown of the workforce in terms of skills, type of contracts, spending on training or 
R&D expenditures. For a complete description of both CBA and CBB databases refer to the CBSO’s Annual Report: 
http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/informes/Publicaciones_an/Central_de_Balan/anoactual/ . 
17 CBB’s (and CBA’s) observations consist mainly of individual entrepreneurs, public corporations and limited liability 
companies which are required by law to deposit their annual accounts at the Mercantile Registries. However, a large 
number of small firms do not fulfill the reporting requirement because it is costly for them and the associated fines are 
small. Moreover, self-employed workers are excluded, as they are not required to report to the Mercantile Registries. 
18 We exclude the primary sector –agriculture, forestry and fishing, and mining and quarrying– because its performance 
is heavily distorted by regulations and public subsidies. Also, because of lack of enough observations, we also remove 
businesses from the following sectors: manufacture of tobacco products, manufacture of coke and refined petroleum 
products, and activities of membership organizations. 
19 We removed observations with excessive changes of gross output, labour costs, intermediate inputs and capital 
stock, defined as those outside the percentiles p1 and p99, for each year and two-digit industry. We also dropped firms 
with extreme labour and materials shares over gross output (above the p99).  
20 The coverage of 2012 is only partial with over 471,000 observations compared with about 531,000 observations on 
average for the period 2004-2011. 
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Table 1: Main summary statistics. Period 2001-2012 
 
The output variable is measured in gross terms, i.e. inclusive of intermediate consumption, 
while we take into account the presence of 3 productive inputs: capital, intermediate inputs 
and labour. Labour refers to the average number of employees in each firm for each year, 
and materials refer to intermediate consumption. The capital stock includes both physical 
and intangible capital, and is measured by the net book value of fixed assets, as reported in 
the firm’s balance sheet. It is deflated with the corresponding (2-digit NACE rev.2) value 
added deflator.21 
Additionally, the estimation of markups using Roeger’s (1995) methodology –see equation 
[10]– requires also information on the user cost of capital (r), which is the price of hiring or 
purchasing one unit of capital services and includes a measure of the financial cost of 
capital and the depreciation rate. One of the advantages of our database is that, unlike 
most studies in the literature, this cost can be calculated at the firm-level, which is likely to 
reduce measurement error. Following Jorgenson and Hall (1967), the user cost of capital of 
firm i in year t is defined as: 
ݎ௜௧ ൌ ሺ݅௜௧ െ ߨ௧ூ ൅ ߜሻ ௧ܲூ   [15] 
where iit is the financial cost of capital, G the depreciation rate and Pt,I and St,I represent the 
level and growth rate of the price of investment goods, respectively. The firm level 
depreciation rate has been fixed at 8%, which is the standard in the literature.22 The price of 
investment goods has been approximated with a 2-digit industry level gross fixed capital 
formation deflator that has been built with information from National Accounts.23   
On the other hand, constructing a proxy for the financial cost of capital which is reasonably 
homogeneous across businesses is a more complex task. In order to maximize the sample 
period available for estimation, we defined the financial cost of capital as the ratio between 
                                                          
21 We are aware of the problems that this generates, because they are valued at historical prices, but this is the only 
proxy we have at our disposal.  
22 It is in line, inter alia, with Amador and Soares (2013), or Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2012). Besides, another 
argument in favor of fixing the depreciation rate is the well-known fact that accounting-based firm-level measures of 
depreciation tend to overestimate the true economic depreciation due to fiscal incentives. 
23 These deflators have been constructed by combining information from the matrices of gross capital formation at a 2-
digit industry level in order to build the shares of each type of investment (structures, buildings, etc) with information from 
deflators for each type of investment.   
Main summary statistics. Period 2001-2012.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Q1 Q2 Q3
(thousands €)
Gross output 2152.9 56105.5 0.02 1.76E+07 112.8 289.3 818.0
Labour costs 350.2 6944.9 0.01 2.19E+06 32.0 78.2 192.7
Fixed capital 954.2 52864.0 0 3.97E+07 11.3 52.0 229.0
Intermediate cons. 1609.6 45411.0 0.01 1.60E+07 55.7 165.2 529.6
(growth rate)
Gross output 0.012 0.434 -4.779 6.921 -0.147 0.014 0.166
Labour costs 0.047 0.385 -3.621 6.731 -0.077 0.031 0.161
Fixed capital 0.007 0.468 -4.534 6.440 -0.186 -0.043 0.069
Intermediate cons. 0.014 0.517 -4.858 8.178 -0.184 0.010 0.200
(ratio)
Lshare 0.345 0.343 1.95E-06 87.7 0.157 0.291 0.461
Mshare 0.639 0.377 1.81E-05 65.6 0.457 0.642 0.803
#Observations: 6055080 (in levels)
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interest (and other financial) charges and (all) financial liabilities for each firm and year, as we 
do not have information on costly and non-costly liabilities for the whole period. This way we 
are underestimating the true financial cost of capital because we are including non-costly 
financial liabilities, such as suppliers and other trade credits.24 Further, and in order to avoid 
a substantial loss of observations, as well as distortions brought about by extreme 
observations, the financial cost of capital has been imputed for some firms. To be more 
specific, the implicit interest rate for firms that report no debt, or no interest payments or 
ratios outside the [0, 1] range was imputed with the median of the respective 2-digit 
industry in each year and by firm size. 
We attain an estimate of firm-level TFP, which, as discussed above, will be the main 
determinant of firm-level heterogeneity used with the aim of estimating price-cost markups. 
We follow the control function method developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2003) in order to estimate firm-level TFP, which has become a standard 
methodology for addressing endogeneity in production function estimations. We assume a 
Cobb-Douglas production function for value added, labour and the capital stock and use 
intermediate inputs instead of investment as a proxy variable for productivity shocks, along 
the lines of Alonso-Borrego (2010) and Hospido and Moreno-Galbis (2015), who also 
estimated firm-level TFP with CBSO data and to whom interested readers are referred to so 
as to get all necessary details of the estimation procedure.  
Figure 4 shows the distribution of estimated TFP for all firms pooled together across two 
periods of time (before and during the crisis). It is worth highlighting that the shape of the 
distribution of firm productivity is far from being “Gaussian”: rather than having many firms 
centred around an ‘average’ performance level, with few very bad- or very good-performing 
ones symmetrically distributed around the mean in equal numbers, data show a large 
heterogeneity in performance, with many relatively low productive firms, but also a certain 
number of particularly high productive ones. As a result, median TFP is significantly below 
the mean, while the resulting distribution is characterized by a relatively long right tail (or 
skewness). According to the model of section 2, this distribution will be replicated in terms 
of markups up to a constant, since this is the only source of heterogeneity within sector. 
Figures 5 show the evolution of the (unweighted) average of the estimated TFP in our 
sample. As it has been widely documented for the Spanish case (see, e.g., Hospido and 
Moreno-Gulbis (2015)), TFP has exhibited a continuously decreasing trend during the boom 
period, a pattern that has been reverted over the crisis. 
                                                          
24 We have checked the robustness of this measure by estimating its correlation with a more precise measure, where 
the denominator of the ratio only includes costly financial liabilities, which is available only for the period 2008-2012. The 
estimated coefficient was 0.379 with a t-statistic of 59.13. 
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Figure 4: Distribution of estimated TFP 
 
Figure 5: Evolution of estimated TFP 
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5 Firm-specific markups during the expansion period 1995-2007 
We first begin by focusing on the results from estimating equation [12] for the period 
2001-2007 for each of the seventy 2-digit sectors considered. This means analyzing 280 
relevant coefficients. In order to organize the discussion, we first show an analysis of the 
statistical significance of all estimated coefficients at a 10% significance level (the dashed line 
in Figure 6). The distribution of p-values of each sector-specific regression for the period 
2001-2007 are plotted in Figure 6. Each box contains the p-values of the 25th and the 75th 
percentile within the 70 regressions. Whiskers represent the interval p25-1.5*IQR and 
p75+1.5*IQR being IQR=p75-p25 the interquartile range. Dots are p-values for estimated 
coefficients that fall outside those intervals and might be considered as outliers. It is clear from 
Figure 6 that estimated parameters for the average markup, the sensitivity of markups to TFP 
differentials, and the bargaining power are mostly statistically significant across all sectors.  
Figure 7 shows average markups ሺȾ଴ୗሻfor the period 2001-2007 estimated for the 70 2-digit 
sectors. According to this figure, the (unweighted) average Lerner index of the Spanish 
economy is around 14%, although price-cost margins lay in an interval of between 0 and 
0.42. This range is similar, for instance, to the one obtained in Estrada (2009) and in Moreno 
and Rodriguez (2011) with a similar empirical framework. Among the sectors that had higher 
average markups during the boom are electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; 
remediation activities and other waste management services; rental and leasing activities; 
accommodation services; water collection, treatment and supply; and architectural and 
engineering services. On the other hand, those sectors with the lowest markups are 
construction of buildings; services to buildings and landscape activities; manufacture of 
 
Figure 6: Significance of estimated coefficients 
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wearing apparel; manufacture of leather and related products; and social work activities 
without accommodation.25  
Figure 8 presents the estimated sensitivities of markups with respect to firm-level TFP 
differentials. The estimated coefficients for TFP are positive and statistically significant across 
(almost) all sectors, meaning that firms with higher relative TFP vis-à-vis average TFP are able 
to charge higher markups. This is consistent with the theory presented in section 2 and would 
lend support to the models where more productive firms acquire more market power. All in 
all, these results would overall be consistent with models that allow for heterogeneity at the 
firm level. 
Among the sectors that had higher sensitivity to productivity differentials of firms during the 
boom are real estate activities; programming and broadcasting activities; health service 
activities; sewerage; rental and leasing activities; and legal and accounting activities. On the 
other hand, those sectors with the lowest differentials are other manufacturing; manufacture 
of food products; food and beverage service activities; land transport and transport via 
pipelines; manufacture of leather and related products. 
                                                          
25 Those sectors with non-significant coefficients, in other words, with a situation close to a competitive setting, are: 
libraries, museums and other cultural activities; information service activities; broadcasting activities; and postal and 
courier activities. 
Figure 7: Estimated average markups 
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 Figure 8: Estimated elasticities of markups w.r.t. TFP differentials 
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One lesson from the evidence above is that markups are heterogeneous across firms. 
Appendix B presents some graphs of the distribution of markups within major sectors and 
their evolution over time. The distribution of estimated markups is far from being Gaussian 
and is mostly characterized by having a relatively long and thick right tail, which is partially 
inherited from the distribution of firm-specific TFP.  
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6 Direction of changes of firm-specific markups during the Great Recession  
Figure 9 presents the distribution of p-values for the interaction of all regressors with the 
dummy for the period 2010-2012 (୲ଶ଴ଵ଴Ȁଵଶ), which tries to account for potential changes in 
structural parameters –which could be linked to variations in pricing strategies– over the crisis 
that would be free of changes in accounting rules. In this case, it can be seen that in most 
dimensions the degree of significance of estimated coefficients is low, affecting only a few 
sectors, except for average markups, which seem to vary in almost 50% of the industries 
considered, and to a less extent for the elasticity of markups with respect to TFP differentials 
(which differ for around 35% of sectors).  
 
Figure 9: Significance of the change over 2008-2012 of the estimated coefficients 
Figure 10 shows that there seems to be a significant increase in average markups for the 
period 2010-2012 with respect to 2001-2007 –once we discount the effect of the changes in 
accounting rules– for around 50% of sectors. It is noticeable as well that there are no 
industries experiencing a statistically significant fall in average markups.26 According to the 
estimations, the sectors where markups were raised the most are real estate; employment 
activities; other professional, scientific and technical activities; manufacture of beverages; and 
electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply.  
Looking at the relevance of differences in markups within sector, it appears that TFP 
differentials (see Figure 11) became less important in around 35% of the sectors. The sectors 
in which it decreased the most are employment activities; manufacture of other transport 
equipment; air transport; waste collection, treatment, and disposal activities; and information 
service activities.  
                                                          
26 Except for creative, arts, and entertainment activities, which display an abnormal drop, not reported to avoid distorting 
the figure. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 25 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1536
Figure 10: Change over 2010-2012 of the estimated average markups 
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Figure 11: Change over 2010-2012 of estimated elasticities of markups w.r.t. TFP differentials 
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7 Interpretation of results  
The previous within sector decrease in markup differentials by TFP is at odds with 
the increase in the variance of TFP unless some other parameters might have changed. 
According to the model set out in section 2, in a given sector s, changes in the 
number of firms in equilibrium (݊ݏ ൌ ඥܮݏݐݏ ݁ݏΤ ) are determined by changes in the size of 
demand (Ls), in the degree of product substitutability (ts) and in the fixed costs of entry (es). 
Since we have access to a good proxy for the changes in the number of firms, which is the 
net entry rate of businesses between 1998 and 2012 by 2-digit sectors, we can dig further 
into the interpretation of our results. 
As we showed in Figure 2, there has been a sharp fall in net entry rates during the crisis. 
Therefore, we have to reconcile several pieces of information, namely, i) an increase in 
average markups (
ݐݏ
݊ݏ ൌ ට
ݐݏ݁ݏ
ܮݏ ) –as displayed in Figure 10–, with ii) a decrease in the elasticity 
of markups with respect to (within-sector) productivity differentials (ߙଵሺݐ௦ሻǡ ݓ݅ݐ݄ߙଵሺݐ௦ሻᇱ ൏ Ͳ) –
as shown in Figure 11– and iii) a sharp fall in net entry rates. Consistent with our model, the 
observed decline in the elasticity of markups vs productivity differentials would point to a rise 
in the degree of product differentiation. Hence, the fall in net entry rates could only be 
reconciled with the increase in average markups if it is driven by either a reduction in the size 
of demand or an upsurge in the fixed costs of entry –or in other words, an increase in fixed 
costs of entry per unit of demand (es/Ls) –. 
Thus, we have indirect evidence of a rise in product substitutability and a relative increase in 
fixed entry costs vis-à-vis the size of demand. If we look at our estimations results, we find 
that in roughly a third of the sectors there is a change in both average markups and markup 
sensitivity to productivity differentials. Moreover, we have another third each with a change in 
either one or the other parameter. In the former case, besides, the change in the average 
markup is negatively correlated with the change in the coefficient of productivity differentials 
(Figure 12). 
Figure 12: Changes in estimated parameters (2001-2007 vs 2008-2012) 
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Table 2 provides additional insight regarding the interpretation of our results. It shows that 
there is a clear pattern of correlation between those changes in estimated parameters and 
variations in net entry rates. In particular, those sectors in which there was an important 
decrease in the number of firms, tended to experience a rise in average markups and a 
decline in their sensitivity to productivity differentials. Moreover, these results would be 
consistent with the idea that entry barriers –relative to the market size– tended to rise for 
about 50% of the sectors, leading to higher average markups. Additionally, within those 
sectors, about two thirds underwent an increase in their shopping costs (or in other words, a 
fall in product substitutability) which contributed to producing an even higher rise in markups. 
Table 2. Correlation between changes in average markups and productivity elasticities and 
net entry rates (Tobit model) 
 
Finally, we present another way to check the consistency of our results. The idea is to run a 
regression of the change in estimated average markups across industries on some proxies for 
the change in the degree of product differentiation and in the fixed costs of entry –relative to 
the market size–. As regards the former, as we mentioned above, we have an indirect proxy 
which is the estimated change in the productivity elasticities, whereas for the latter, a 
reasonable proxy frequently used in the literature is the sectoral capital intensity –defined as 
the ratio between the stock of capital and output at a sector level–. Results for this estimation 
exercise are presented in Table 3, where it can be seen that, consistent with the predictions 
of our model, there is a positive relation between average markups and product 
substitutability (collected through the negative sign in the coefficient estimated for the change 
in the productivity elasticity). Besides, the coefficient for the change in capital intensity is 
positive and statistically significant, again in harmony with our model’s predictions. 
Table 3. Sectoral regression for average markups (changes 2001/07 vs 2008/12). 
 
g y p y
Variable Average markup Productiviy differences
changes net entry -0,508 0.519***
(0.3641) (0.1595)
Constant 0,000 0.016
-0,0235 (.0166)
Observations 62 62
R2 0,168 0,002
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Change 2010-2012 vs 1995-2007
Variable Average markup
Prod. diffs. -0.377
(0.193)**
Cap. intensity 0.105
(0.023)***
Constant 0.022
(0.012)**
Observations 70
R2 0.266
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8 Conclusions 
A competitive business environment is a key ingredient for achieving an efficient 
allocation of resources and, thus, for understanding the drivers of countries’ productivity and 
long term growth. Measuring the degree of competition is a first step in any effort at 
understanding the (in)efficiency in the process of resource allocation across firms. In this 
regard, a natural starting point in order to measure the extent of competitiveness in a given 
industry is, from a theoretical point of view, the notion of market power. Market power is the 
ability of a firm to set prices above marginal cost –the welfare-maximizing reference under 
perfect competition–. Thus, policy makers are used to analyzing changes in market power 
through the lens of changes in average markups. However, scholars in industrial organization 
have shown that markups could be very heterogeneous across firms, so composition effects 
will contaminate any policy implication derived from the cyclical behavior of markups at a 
sectoral level. Also, from a policy perspective it is important to analyze whether changes in 
pricing strategies occur within or between sectors.  
This paper delivers a way of analyzing firm-specific markups over time. In order to account for 
markup heterogeneity within sector, we expand Roeger’s (1995) methodology by including 
the main sources of cost efficiency of firms within sector (TFP differentials), as derived from 
the theoretical model of spatial competition developed by Vogel (2008). This is useful because 
by accounting for changes in markup differentials across firms will help in distinguishing 
demand and supply factors affecting markup changes. As we have shown, we can 
disentangle these two forces because demand factors (summarized by changes in the degree 
of substitutability among varieties) affect both the average markup and markup differentials 
among firms with different productivity levels, whereas supply-side factors (reflecting mostly 
barriers to entry) only affect average markups. 
We find that the assumption of perfect competition in Spanish product markets is widely 
rejected. The estimated price-cost margin ranges between 0 and 0.4 on average across 
sectors in the Spanish economy. Moreover, we can use these estimated markups to establish 
a ranking of sectors in terms of degree of competition, finding that the less competitive ones 
are electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; remediation activities and other waste 
management services; rental and leasing activities; accommodation services; water 
collection, treatment and supply; and architectural and engineering services. Additionally, it is 
confirmed, as implied by our reference theoretical background, that there is substantial 
heterogeneity in price-cost margin estimates within markets, as firms with higher relative TFP 
present higher markups.  
We look into the temporal dimension and try to disentangle whether pricing strategies 
changed between 2001-2007 and 2008-2012, a period which is characterized by a huge 
destruction of firms. Our results indicate that for around 50% of sectors average markups 
increased, while for around 35% of industries the relevance of within-sector markup 
heterogeneity decreased. We provide evidence showing that these results, along with a sharp 
fall in net entry rates, can be rationalized within our theoretical framework, and are indicative 
of an increase in both product substitutability and in fixed entry costs over the crisis. Further 
research should be devoted to understanding what is behind this shift in the behaviour of 
demand, as well as in the evolution of entry costs.  
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Appendix A: Sector classification 
 
 
 
Code Description Code Description
10 Manufacture of food products
11 Manufacture of beverages
12 Manufacture of tobacco products
13 Manufacture of textiles
14 Manufacture of wearing apparel
15 Manufacture of leather and related products
16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture 
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
23 Manufacture of other nonmetallic mineral products
24 Manufacture of basic metals
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment 
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semitrailers
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment
31 Manufacture of furniture
32 Other manufacturing
33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment
35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
36 Water collection, treatment and supply
37 Sewerage
38 Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery
39 Remediation activities and other waste management services
41 Construction of buildings
42 Civil engineering
43 Specialised construction activities
45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
46
Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
47
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
49 Land transport and transport via pipelines
50 Water transport
51 Air transport
52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation
53 Postal and courier activities
55 Accommodation
56
Food and beverage service activities
58 Publishing activities
59 Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound recording and music publishing 
60 Programming and broadcasting activities
61 Telecommunications
62 Computer programming, consultancy and related activities
63 Information service activities
L Real estate 
activities 
68
Real estate activities
69 Legal and accounting activities
70 Activities of head offices; management consultancy activities
71 Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis
72 Scientific research and development
73 Advertising and market research
74 Other professional, scientific and technical activities
75 Veterinary activities
77 Rental and leasing activities
78 Employment activities
79 Travel agency, tour operator and other reservation service and related activities
80 Security and investigation activities
81 Services to buildings and landscape activities
82 Office administrative, office support and other business support activities
85 Education
86 Human health activities
87 Residential care activities
88 Social work activities without accommodation
90 Creative, arts and entertainment activities
91 Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities
92 Gambling and betting activities
93 Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities
95 Repair of computers and personal and household goods
96 Other personal service activities
Other Services
D, E Public Utilities
N 
Administrative 
and support
service activities
M 
Professional, 
scientific and 
technical 
activities 
P, Q, R, S
H Transportation 
and storage
I 
Accommodation 
and food service 
activities 
J Information and 
communication
C Manufacturing 
F Construction 
G 
Wholesale and
retail trade;repair
of motor vehicles
and motorcycles 
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Appendix B. Distribution of firm-specific markups across macro-sectors 
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